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THE UNJUST APPLICATION OF MIRANDA: 
BERGHUIS v. THOMPKINS AND ITS 
INEQUITABLE EFFECTS ON MINORITY 
POPULATIONS 
Michael O’Neil* 
Abstract: In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in 
order to invoke the right to remain silent during a custodial interroga-
tion, a criminal suspect must do so clearly and unambiguously. The Court 
also held that the Thompkins suspect’s conduct during his interrogation— 
remaining mostly silent for almost three hours before offering three one-
word responses—was sufficient to indicate waiver of his right to remain si-
lent. This Comment argues that these holdings serve to curtail the rights 
established in Miranda v. Arizona, in line with the recent direction of the 
Court’s jurisprudence with respect to custodial interrogations. This 
Comment further argues that, although Thompkins’s dual holdings will 
abridge the constitutional rights of all criminal suspects, they will even 
more substantially curtail the rights of minority populations in the United 
States. 
Introduction 
 In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that in the context 
of custodial interrogations criminal suspects enjoy both a right to re-
main silent and a right to have legal counsel present during their inter-
views.1 The Court expressed concern over the “inherently compelling 
pressures” suspects face in custodial interrogations and worried that 
such pressures may lead to incriminating statements in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination.2 Scholars 
argue, however, that the social and legal backdrop against which Miran-
da was decided proves that the Court was more narrowly focused on 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2010–2011). 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
2 See id. at 456, 467 (noting that “without proper safeguards, the process of in-custody 
interrogation . . . contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the 
individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak,” and further noting that the Court 
was “primarily [concerned] with this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring”); 
Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 112 (1998). 
86 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
protecting the rights of poor and minority populations.3 On June 1, 
2010, the Supreme Court decided Berghuis v. Thompkins, which followed 
a pattern established by several preceding cases and departed substan-
tially from this central premise of Miranda.4 In doing so, the Court has 
encouraged a course of police conduct harmful to the rights of all crim-
inal suspects, but particularly the rights of marginalized, traditionally 
powerless segments of society.5 
 This Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s holding in Thomp-
kins in terms of its place in the Court’s custodial interrogation juris-
prudence and demonstrates that the case is the latest in a line of cases 
to depart from the fundamental principles of Miranda. Part I describes 
the background of the Thompkins decision, starting with Miranda and 
moving through the relevant Supreme Court cases modifying the doc-
trine. It also examines the facts and holdings of Thompkins and explains 
where the case fits within the Miranda line of cases. Part II argues that 
both the invocation holding and the waiver holding in Thompkins are in 
direct conflict with the law and policy embodied in Miranda and will 
lead to the retrenchment of the rights of interrogated persons. Finally, 
Part III argues that the application of Thompkins’s holdings will have 
more significant and detrimental effects on traditionally powerless 
segments of U.S. society. 
I. The Miranda Doctrine 
 In one of its best-known decisions, the Supreme Court held in Mi-
randa that statements made by suspects during custodial interrogations 
                                                                                                                      
3 See George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona: “Embed-
ded” in Our National Culture?, 29 Crime & Just. 203, 221 (2002) (“Miranda was simply about 
police taking advantage of suspects who were poor, ignorant, frightened, and thus no 
match for police interrogators.”); Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 120. 
4 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2271–72 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing); Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 
(1986); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 487 (1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 
441 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). In Thompkins, 
the Court referred to Miranda’s “core ruling” simply as excluding unwarned statements 
from evidence. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (majority opinion) (quoting Dickerson v. 
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000)). Yet, previous cases upon which the majority 
relied recalled Miranda’s “central ‘virtue of informing police and prosecutors with specific-
ity . . . what they may do in conducting [a] custodial interrogation’” but understood “the 
need for effective law enforcement.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 461; Burbine, 475 U.S. at 426 (quot-
ing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979)). 
5 See Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1519, 1592 (2008). See 
generally Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police 
Interrogation, 103 Yale L.J. 259 (1993) (arguing that requiring a clear and unambiguous 
statement to invoke the right to counsel disadvantages women and minority populations). 
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would be inadmissible unless authorities informed the suspects of their 
rights.6 Miranda required officers to warn suspects of the right to re-
main silent and the right to an attorney during questioning.7 Although 
Miranda is considered the landmark decision, it is just one in a line of 
cases in which the Supreme Court has attempted to strike a balance 
between the state’s law enforcement interests and the constitutional 
rights of suspects.8 In some ways, though, Miranda represents the high-
water mark of the Court’s concern for individual rights; since Miranda, 
the Court has shifted more in favor of the state’s interests.9 
A. Before Miranda: Supreme Court Precedent and Social Realities 
 Prior to Miranda, the Court recognized in Escobedo v. Illinois that, 
after a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel, is denied, and the 
police do not warn the suspect of the right to remain silent, no state-
ment made during a custodial interrogation can be used against that 
suspect.10 The Miranda Court supplemented Escobedo’s protections 
when it held that the prosecutor carries a “heavy burden” and must 
demonstrate that a suspect waived his or her rights before any state-
ments become admissible.11 
 In Miranda, the Court expressed its uneasiness with the “inher-
ently compelling” psychological pressures of police interrogations.12 
These pressures had long been a concern for the Court, however, and 
so the timing of the decision in Miranda is particularly relevant.13 At 
                                                                                                                      
6 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 110 
(“Miranda v. Arizona may be the United States Supreme Court’s best-known decision.”). 
7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
8 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
426 (1986); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85, 487 (1981); North Carolina v. But-
ler, 441 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975); Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 444; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964). 
9 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (observing that the 
Court’s “subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law 
enforcement”); Davis, 512 U.S. at 461 (declaring that the Court “must consider the other 
side of the Miranda equation: the need for effective law enforcement”); Burbine, 475 U.S. at 
427 (denying the exclusion of confessions in part because of the “substantial cost to soci-
ety’s legitimate and substantial interest in securing admissions of guilt” that would result). 
10 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490–91. 
11 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
12 See id. at 455–57, 467; Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 112 (describing Miranda’s origi-
nal purpose as “protecting the privilege against self-incrimination and its underlying values 
by influencing police behavior during custodial interrogations”). 
13 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944) (“We think a situation such 
as that here . . . is so inherently coercive that its very existence is irreconcilable with the 
possession of mental freedom . . . .”); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 240 (1941) (“Of-
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the time Miranda was decided, shifting attitudes in the United States 
resulted in increased recognition of the struggles of minority popula-
tions.14 Miranda’s protections were intended to benefit poor and mi-
nority populations because these were the populations least likely to 
know and assert their rights.15 Since that time, the understanding of 
the protections originally intended in Miranda and the underlying 
rationale for those protections have been distorted.16 The Court has 
become overly concerned with the state’s interest in effective law en-
forcement, and the resulting distortion of the Miranda doctrine is 
eroding the rights it was originally intended to protect.17 
B. After Miranda: Development of the Invocation Holding 
 After Miranda, in Edwards v. Arizona, the Court dealt with a suspect 
who had invoked his right to an attorney and then went on to make 
incriminating statements.18 The Court held that the suspect’s incrimi-
nating statements were not admissible because once a suspect invokes 
the right to an attorney, the police may not continue the interrogation 
without obtaining an express waiver.19 This affirmation of the concerns 
of Miranda, however, came at a destructive cost because Edwards laid 
the foundation for the Court’s holding in Davis v. United States.20 
                                                                                                                      
ficers of the law must realize that if they indulge in [practices such as subjecting suspects to 
questioning for long periods] they may, in the end, defeat rather than further the ends of 
justice.”); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936) (“Coercing the supposed state’s 
criminals into confessions and using such confessions so coerced from them against them 
in trials has been the curse of all countries.”); see also Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gate-
houses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell to Gideon, from Escobedo to 
. . . , in The Miranda Debate: Law, Justice, and Policing 25, 25–26 (Richard A. Leo & 
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) (noting that, by the 1940s, the Supreme Court began 
seriously developing its jurisprudence with respect to custodial interrogations). 
14 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 217 (declaring that racism in police practices be-
came more of a concern in 1950s and 1960s and noting the “1960s also brought a height-
ened concern about fairness and distributive justice”). 
15 See id. (“[T]he cases from the 1950s often had poor black suspects facing white po-
lice in a Southern police station.”); Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 120 (noting that the 
Court’s opinion in Miranda “[took] care to indicate the particular impact of these pres-
sures upon minorities and the poor”). 
16 See Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 132 (arguing that a “new vision of Miranda” has 
emerged). 
17 See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 426 (describing Miranda’s directive as giving police and pros-
ecutors instructions for custodial interrogations); Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 132. 
18 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 479. 
19 See id. at 484–85, 487. 
20 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 458; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85; Marcy Strauss, The Sounds of 
Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 773, 814 (2009) (“While the Davis Court overestimated the cost to law 
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 In Davis, the Court held that in order to invoke the right to an at-
torney, a suspect must do so “sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police 
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a 
request for an attorney.”21 The resulting doctrine concerning the invo-
cation of the right to counsel is clear: a suspect must clearly and unam-
biguously assert the right to counsel; once he or she asserts the right, 
police may not resume questioning unless they obtain an express waiv-
er.22 
 A different rule, however, developed with respect to the right to 
remain silent.23 In Michigan v. Mosley, the Court decided that once a sus-
pect invokes his or her right to remain silent, authorities can continue 
the interrogation if the right is “scrupulously honored.”24 In Mosley, the 
suspect had invoked his right to remain silent, and the interrogation 
ceased for more than two hours.25 Subsequently, different officers re-
read the suspect his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him 
about a separate crime at a different location.26 The Court found his 
right to remain silent was therefore “scrupulously honored.”27 The 
Court did not, however, address the implications of an ambiguous invo-
cation of the right to remain silent in the way Davis did with respect to 
an ambiguous invocation of the right to counsel.28 The Court would not 
do so until Thompkins.29 
C. After Miranda: Development of the Waiver Holding 
 In North Carolina v. Butler, the Court addressed the heavy burden 
that Miranda imposed upon the prosecution to demonstrate that a sus-
pect knowingly waived his or her rights prior to offering an incriminat-
ing statement.30 The suspect in Butler refused to sign a form indicating 
                                                                                                                      
enforcement if ambiguous invocations were treated as invocations (or required to be clari-
fied), they underestimated (or ignored) the significant costs to the objectives of Miranda—
ensuring a free and voluntary choice to submit to police interrogation.”). 
21 Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. 
22 See id.; Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. 
23 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 816. 
24 Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104. 
25 Id. at 97, 104. 
26 Id. at 97–98. 
27 See id. at 104–06. 
28 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 784. 
29 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260 (2010); Strauss, supra note 20, at 
784. Professor Strauss’s research indicates that Davis’s clear and unambiguous invocation 
requirement had been applied to the right to remain silent in a majority of lower courts 
prior to Thompkins. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 784. 
30 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373–74. 
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waiver of his rights, but he stated that he wanted to talk to the officers 
and subsequently made incriminating statements.31 He was silent as to 
his right to counsel.32 He challenged the admission of his statements 
because he had not waived his right to an attorney.33 The Court held 
that an express waiver is not necessary and waiver may “clearly [be] in-
ferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.”34 This 
holding was meant to apply to both the right to remain silent and the 
right to counsel; courts applying the Butler holding have found waivers 
of both rights based upon a statement of the accused during interroga-
tion.35 Not until Thompkins, however, did the Supreme Court apply But-
ler in such a way.36 
D. Filling the Gaps: The Thompkins Decision 
 In Thompkins, the defendant, Van Chester Thompkins, was sus-
pected of involvement in a fatal shooting.37 The following year, Thomp-
kins was found and arrested.38 During a subsequent interrogation, one 
of the two interrogating detectives presented Thompkins with a form 
based on the Miranda rule, part of which Thompkins read aloud.39 De-
tectives then read him the remaining rights guaranteed by Miranda.40 
When the detectives asked Thompkins to sign a form demonstrating he 
understood his rights, however, he declined.41 
 The interrogation lasted three hours, and at no point did Thomp-
kins say he did not want to answer questions or that he wanted a lawyer 
present.42 He was mostly silent during the first two hours and forty-five 
minutes of the interview, although he did answer questions unrelated 
                                                                                                                      
31 Butler, 441 U.S. at 371. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 373. 
35 See id. (“An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent 
or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not 
inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”); Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 
1582 (“My own research shows that every federal court of appeals has upheld the admis-
sion of a statement based upon an implied Miranda waiver.”). 
36 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256–57, 2261, 2264; id. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing); infra note 88 and accompanying text. 
37 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256 (majority opinion). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256. 
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to the shooting.43 After the initial period of silence, Thompkins made 
the statements at issue in his appeal; the Court recounted the events as 
follows: 
About 2 hours and 45 minutes into the interrogation, [Detec-
tive] Helgert asked Thompkins, “Do you believe in God?” 
Thompkins . . . said “Yes,” as his eyes “well[ed] up with tears.” 
Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God?” Thompkins said “Yes.” 
Helgert asked, “Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting 
that boy down?” Thompkins answered “Yes” and looked away. 
Thompkins refused to make a written confession, and the in-
terrogation ended about 15 minutes later.44 
 At trial, the judge denied Thompkins’s motion to suppress the in-
criminating statements.45 Thompkins was convicted of first-degree 
murder and sentenced to life in prison.46 Thompkins subsequently ap-
pealed the trial judge’s refusal to suppress his pretrial statements under 
Miranda.47 When the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling, Thompkins filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 
claiming his incarceration was unlawful because the trial court erred in 
admitting the statements used to convict him.48 The Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals found in favor of Thompkins, holding the evidence indi-
cated he did not wish to waive his rights.49 The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that (1) in order to invoke the right to remain silent 
during a custodial interrogation, a suspect must unambiguously make a 
statement asserting that right, and (2) a suspect who is read his or her 
rights, understands them, is not coerced, and makes a statement has 
waived his or her Miranda rights.50 
                                                                                                                      
43 Id. at 2256–57. The record indicates that, aside from the incriminating statements, 
the responses Thompkins gave were statements that he “didn’t want a peppermint” and 
the chair that he was sitting in was hard. Id. 
44 Id. at 2257 (citations omitted). 
45 Id. at 2258. 
46 Id. at 2257–58. 
47 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2258. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 2258–59; Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 588 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 
S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
50 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260, 2264. 
92 Boston College Third World Law Journal Vol. 31: E. Supp. 
II. Implications of Thompkins for Poor and Minority 
Populations 
 Thompkins is the latest in a line of cases scaling back Miranda’s pro-
tections.51 In its dual holdings—the invocation holding and the waiver 
holding—the Court supplemented the principles announced in previ-
ous cases and “filled holes” in the jurisprudence of custodial interroga-
tions.52 Combined with these previous cases, Thompkins will have the 
practical effect of increasing the state’s power at the expense of crimi-
nal suspects, especially poor and minority suspects.53 
A. The Invocation Holding: Applying the Clear Statement Rule  
to the Right to Remain Silent 
 The Thompkins Court held that, in order to invoke the right to re-
main silent, a suspect must do so clearly and unambiguously.54 In effect, 
Thompkins applied the clear statement rule from Davis, which impli-
cated only to the right to an attorney, to the right to remain silent.55 
Unfortunately, this holding will lead to significant problems and fur-
ther abridge the rights of interrogated persons.56 
 First, in requiring clear, unambiguous statements to assert one’s 
rights, the Court implicitly assumed that suspects who make ambiguous 
assertions are unsure that they want to invoke these rights.57 In fact, as 
studies show, it is likely that the pressures of the custodial interrogation 
setting cause suspects to adopt a less direct mode of speaking.58 There-
fore, interrogators may interpret an invocation as ambiguous when, in 
                                                                                                                      
51 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2260, 2264 (2010); Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373–74 (1979). 
52 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260, 2264; Strauss, supra note 20, at 784; Weisselberg, 
supra note 5, at 1582, 1590. 
53 See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 261; Strauss, supra note 20, at 811–14. 
54 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260. 
55 See id.; Davis, 512 U.S. at 459; Strauss, supra note 20, at 784. 
56 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 802–03, 816. 
57 See id. at 804. Professor Strauss outlines the following three possible interpretations 
of an ambiguous invocation: (1) the suspect is actually uncertain; (2) he or she is not un-
certain but cannot articulate clearly given the circumstances; or (3) the person is afraid of 
the consequences that follow from asserting the right. See id. 
58 See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 263–64 (arguing that the “asymmetries of power” in-
herent in an interrogation increase the likelihood that the suspect will use ambiguous 
language); see also Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1589 (“To avoid offending those in power 
and for other reasons, suspects may articulate their positions in tentative ways; but tenta-
tive assertions of rights will not be recognized as invocations under an ‘unambiguous or 
unequivocal’ standard.”). 
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reality, the suspect is attempting to assert his or her rights clearly.59 To 
compound this problem, when suspects feel as if their initial invocation 
has been ignored, they tend to believe any further assertion would be 
futile and thus are less likely to assert their rights again.60 These are 
precisely the type of subtle psychological pressures inherent in interro-
gations the Miranda Court sought to obviate.61 Thus, Thompkins and 
Davis directly subvert the central goal of Miranda—the protection of 
the suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.62 
 Second, although the Thompkins majority stated there is “no princi-
pled reason” to establish separate rules with regard to invocation of the 
two different Miranda rights, courts regularly act to the contrary without 
significant problems.63 Moreover, the Court established two different 
rules with respect to what must occur after a suspect invokes a Miranda 
right—one for the right to remain silent and another for the right to an 
attorney.64 Under Mosley, when a suspect invokes the right to remain si-
lent, interrogators are free to recommence the interrogation provided 
the suspect’s rights are “scrupulously honored.”65 Conversely, when a 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 804. 
60 See id. at 775. 
61 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) (observing that “the modern prac-
tice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented”); Strauss, 
supra note 20, at 822. 
62 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58; Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1588, 1592. 
63 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260; Strauss, supra note 20, at 816 (noting that “in virtu-
ally every other aspect of the rules, the courts go out of their way to develop distinct stan-
dards”). There are a number of reasons why, as Professor Strauss argues, courts should not 
apply the Davis clear statement rule to the right to remain silent. See Strauss, supra note 20, 
at 816–17. The invocation of the two different rights implicates different procedures for 
law enforcement officers to follow. See id. at 816; infra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. 
Additionally, as Professor Strauss notes, “the right to remain silent is the transcendent 
right protected by Miranda” and therefore should be treated differently than the right to 
counsel. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 817. See generally Wayne D. Holly, Ambiguous Invoca-
tions of the Right to Remain Silent: A Post-Davis Analysis and Proposal, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 
558 (1998) (examining the difference between the right to remain silent and the right to 
counsel and arguing that Davis should not be applied to the former). 
64 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74. Miranda made no distinctions between the right to 
remain silent and the right to an attorney with respect to the rules for police conduct after 
the invocation of the rights. See id. The Court stated, “If the individual states that he wants 
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.” Id. at 474. The 
Court also declared, “If the individual indicates in any manner . . . that he wishes to re-
main silent, the interrogation must cease.” Id. But see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
484–85 (1981) (modifying Miranda with respect to police conduct after a suspect’s invoca-
tion of the right to an attorney); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103–04 (1975) (modify-
ing Miranda with respect to police conduct after a suspect’s invocation of the right to re-
main silent). 
65 See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103–04. In Mosley, the Court identified six factors that bear on 
whether the right to remain silent is “scrupulously honored.” See id. at 104–05. In deciding 
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suspect invokes his right to counsel, Edwards establishes that the interro-
gation must cease until an attorney is present unless the suspect initiates 
the conversation.66 Therefore, application of the Davis clear statement 
rule to the right to remain silent has a different effect than its applica-
tion to the right to counsel.67 If ambiguous invocation of the right to 
remain silent were sufficient to trigger Miranda’s protections, the inter-
rogator would only have to pause and “scrupulously honor” a suspect’s 
rights before commencing questioning.68 If ambiguous invocation of the 
right to counsel were sufficient to trigger Miranda’s protections, the in-
terrogator would be forced to cease the interrogation altogether.69 
 An additional problem exists when attempting to reconcile the 
invocation holding with the explicit language of Miranda.70 In Miranda, 
the Court specifically held, “If the individual indicates in any manner, 
at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain 
silent, the interrogation must cease.”71 Given Miranda’s concern over 
the coercive atmosphere of interrogations and its stated desire to pro-
tect suspects’ rights rigorously, the most logical interpretive application 
                                                                                                                      
that the suspect’s rights were, indeed, “scrupulously honored” in Mosley, the Court found 
the following: (1) the interrogation ceased immediately when the suspect stated he did not 
want to discuss the robberies; (2) an interval of “more than two hours” passed; (3) the 
suspect was re-read his Miranda rights at the beginning of the second interview; (4) the 
subsequent questioning pertained to a different matter; (5) the suspect was questioned by 
different officers; and (6) the questioning took place at a different location. Id. Professor 
Strauss has observed, however, that “most courts only require three” of these factors to find 
that a suspect’s rights were “scrupulously honored.” Strauss, supra note 20, at 811–12. Her 
research shows the significant factors are “that the original interrogation immediately 
cease, that there be a significant passage of time, and that the suspect be afforded a fresh 
set of Miranda warnings.” Id. at 812. 
66 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–85. Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority in Davis, 
reasoned that as long as the invocation of the right to an attorney was ambiguous, Edwards 
did not require the interrogation to cease. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459. This rule from Edwards, 
which applies only to the right to an attorney, seemed to be the basis for the Davis Court’s 
holding that invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous, because otherwise 
an ambiguous invocation “would needlessly prevent the police from questioning a suspect 
in the absence of counsel even if the suspect did not wish to have a lawyer present.” See id. 
at 460. The same reasoning does not, however, apply to the right to remain silent because 
invocation of that right does not require that the interrogation cease until a lawyer arrives. 
See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103–04; Strauss, supra note 20, at 816. The Thompkins majority 
should have considered the distinction between the two rights, in terms of the practical 
effects of invocation on police interrogations, in deciding whether the Davis clear state-
ment rule is a necessary or prudent requirement for invoking the right to remain silent. 
See Strauss, supra note 20, at 816. 
67 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 816. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
70 See id. at 817–18. 
71 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74. 
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of this language should be to resolve ambiguities in favor of the sus-
pect.72 Thus, the Thompkins holding is a clear example of the Court 
moving away from the primary concerns of Miranda and focusing more 
on the law-enforcement interest of creating bright-line rules.73 
B. The Waiver Holding: Decreasing the Burden on the Prosecution  
to Show Waiver 
 The Thompkins Court held that a suspect who makes an uncoerced 
statement to officers, after receiving and understanding his or her 
rights, has impliedly waived his or her Miranda rights.74 This holding is 
a reversion to a pre-Miranda understanding of suspects’ rights and pro-
secutorial burdens.75 Read in conjunction, Miranda and Butler establish 
that the prosecution bears a “heavy burden” to prove waiver and courts 
must presume a defendant did not waive his or her rights.76 Yet, the 
Court found that the prosecution met the burden in Thompkins.77 With 
such a clear departure from the Miranda doctrine on waiver, the Court 
has eroded a suspect’s right to remain silent to such a degree that it is 
now effectively nonexistent.78 In this way, the Thompkins implied-waiver 
doctrine undermines Miranda’s core purpose of protecting the right 
against self-incrimination and providing meaningful redress for in-
fringement of that right.79 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 817–18; Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 221; Weissel-
berg, supra note 2, at 120. 
73 Compare Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2268–69 (“Suppression of a voluntary confession in 
these circumstances would place a significant burden on society’s interest in prosecuting 
criminal activity.”), with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456 (“[W]e concern ourselves primarily with 
this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring.”). 
74 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
75 See Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1578, 1583, 1590. 
76 See Butler, 441 U.S at 373; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
77 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264. 
78 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 803; Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1578, 1591 (arguing 
that, because of the shift from placing the burden on prosecutors to prove waiver to plac-
ing the burden on suspects to invoke their rights clearly, it cannot reasonably be main-
tained “that these procedures counter the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ of custodial 
interrogation”). 
79 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct at 2267–68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Supreme Court 
precedent embracing the proposition that Miranda’s safeguards must be enforced to guaran-
tee the Constitution’s Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination); Miran-
da, 384 U.S. at 439; see also Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1583, 1590 (arguing that the implied-
waiver doctrine has “altered the contours” of the Miranda doctrine and observing that those 
who still cling to the belief that Miranda protects suspects’ rights must be able to “show that 
suspects are generally able to communicate to officers”). 
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 The ruling in Thompkins contradicts Miranda’s understanding of 
when waiver will be found.80 Miranda dealt explicitly with the issue of a 
suspect’s waiver of rights and declared that “a valid waiver will not be 
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are 
given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually 
obtained.”81 Butler clarified Miranda and established that a suspect 
could waive the right to remain silent through “a course of conduct in-
dicating waiver.”82 Implicit in this clarification, however, was the notion 
that a “course of conduct” was a series of affirmative acts unmistakably 
indicating that the suspect intended to waive his or her right to remain 
silent.83 Thus, Butler maintained allegiance to Miranda’s statement that 
a suspect’s eventual confession after a long period of silence would not 
constitute waiver.84 
 Yet in Thompkins, the Court found waiver in exactly these circum-
stances.85 The Court reasoned that, under Butler, Thompkins’s waiver of 
his right to remain silent could be inferred from his actions and 
words.86 Given the dual admonitions of Miranda and Butler about waiv-
er—that the prosecutor’s burden in proving waiver is heavy and an 
eventual confession is not sufficient to establish waiver—Thompkins 
seems to be an incorrect application of the Supreme Court’s own 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; see also Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2268–70, 2272 (So-
tomayor, J., dissenting). 
81 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
82 See Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. 
83 See id. Specifically, the Court noted in Butler that even though silence in the face of 
the warnings was not enough to indicate waiver, “silence, coupled with an understanding 
of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver” may, in some circumstances, “sup-
port a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights.” See id. The Court added that 
“courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights,” and the prosecution bears 
a heavy burden to prove the circumstances in which waiver “can be clearly inferred from 
the actions and words of the person interrogated.” Id. Waiver of any constitutional right 
must be determined on the particular facts of each case, including the background and 
conduct of the suspect. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The particular facts 
of Butler included a clear statement that the suspect wanted to talk to his interrogators, 
followed by a full conversation in which he made inculpatory statements. See 441 U.S. at 
371. In contrast, Thompkins never made such a clear statement or engaged in other af-
firmative acts clearly indicating waiver. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2271 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
84 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2269 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Butler 441 U.S. at 373. 
85 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256–57, 2264 (majority opinion); id. at 2268–70, 2272 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Rarely do this Court’s precedents provide clearly established 
law so closely on point with the facts of a particular case.”); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
86 Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (majority opinion). 
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precedent.87 Rather than expressly contradicting Miranda on this point, 
however, in Thompkins the Court quietly but thoroughly undermined 
the force of Miranda’s directives with respect to evaluating waiver, the-
reby weakening its Fifth Amendment protections.88 
 The Thompkins holding also applies a different definition of coer-
cion than Miranda contemplated.89 Thompkins was not physically co-
erced or threatened into talking; but the psychological pressures inher-
ent in custodial interrogations, with which Miranda was concerned and 
to which Thompkins was subjected, are in many ways more compelling 
than physical coercion.90 The Miranda Court described a scenario strik-
ingly similar to that present in Thompkins when it was discussing the no-
tion of subtle coercion, writing, 
[T]he fact of lengthy interrogation . . . is strong evidence that 
the accused did not validly waive his rights. In these circum-
stances the fact that the individual eventually made a state-
ment is consistent with the conclusion that the compelling in-
fluence of the interrogation finally forced him to do so. It is 
                                                                                                                      
87 See id.; Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; see also George C. Thomas 
III, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 
Mich. L. Rev. 1081, 1099 (2001) (“Miranda could be read to require considerably more to 
prove waiver than has turned out to be the standard.”). As Justice Sotomayor noted in her 
dissent, “Thompkins’s ‘actions and words’ preceding the inculpatory statements simply do 
not evidence a ‘course of conduct indicating waiver’ sufficient to carry the prosecution’s 
burden. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Butler, 441 U.S. 
at 373).  
88 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct at 2261 (majority opinion); id. at 2267–68, 2272 (Sotomayor, 
J., dissenting). In reality, the federal courts have been misapplying Butler for years, and the 
Thompkins waiver holding may not have significant practical effect. See Weisselberg, supra 
note 5, at 1582 (“My own research shows that every federal court of appeals has upheld the 
admission of a statement based upon an implied Miranda waiver.”); see also Thomas, supra 
note 87, at 1082 (noting that once courts establish that warnings were read to a suspect in 
a language he or she understands, “courts find waiver in almost every case”). It is neverthe-
less significant that the Supreme Court has now put its imprimatur on this erroneous read-
ing of Butler. See Thomas, supra note 87, at 1082; Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1582. 
89 Compare Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (majority opinion) (concluding that as long as 
Thompkins was not threatened or fearful, his statement was not coerced), with Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 455 (focusing on the capacity for custodial interrogation to coerce suspects 
into making self-incriminating statements not through violence or the threat of violence 
but through more subtle means). 
90 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (“Thompkins does not claim that police threatened 
or injured him during the interrogation . . . .”); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 (“Even without 
employing brutality . . . the very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on indi-
vidual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.”); see also Strauss, supra note 20, at 
776 (noting that the Miranda Court was concerned with sophisticated police interrogation 
tactics leading to coerced statements, not overt brutality). 
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inconsistent with any notion of a voluntary relinquishment of 
the privilege.91 
Under a proper reading of Miranda, then, the fact that the interroga-
tion lasted as long as it did and through Thompkins’s silence would 
counsel against finding waiver due to the existence of coercive time 
pressure.92 Intensifying the coercive dynamics of Thompkins’s interro-
gation was the investigator’s appeal to his religious beliefs after a leng-
thy interrogation.93 As the Court noted in Miranda, “[A]ny evidence 
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of 
course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privi-
lege.”94 Although the majority in Thompkins held that appealing to Mr. 
Thompkins’s religious beliefs was not trickery, it undoubtedly increased 
the pressure to talk.95 
 Finally, the Thompkins Court’s conception of what is required for a 
suspect to “understand” his or her Miranda rights is arguably more lim-
ited than the Miranda Court’s conception.96 Thompkins presented evi-
dence indicating that he only superficially understood his rights.97 The 
                                                                                                                      
91 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. This dicta from Miranda seems to contradict the Thompkins 
majority’s contention that “there is no authority for the proposition that an interrogation 
of this length is inherently coercive.” See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
476. The Court nevertheless attempted to support its assertion and distinguish Thompkins 
by noting that cases in which confessions were excluded due to the length of the interro-
gation sessions generally dealt with interrogations longer than three hours and contained 
an additional factor of coercion. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256, 2263; cf. Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–64, 163 n.1 (1986) (declaring that, when examining police 
conduct during custodial interrogations to determine if a suspect’s rights have been vio-
lated, the Court looks for “a substantial element of coercive police conduct” and collecting 
authorities for the proposition that the length of interrogation is not dispositive). 
92 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. The length of the interrogation is one of many coercive 
factors the Court explored and attempted to counteract in Miranda. See id. at 449–55. 
93 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2257. 
94 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
95 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263; Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 288. Professor Ains-
worth specifically cites “appeals to the suspect’s religious values” as a tactic that is designed 
to weaken the will of the suspect and control the interrogation. Id. Although the majority 
in Thompkins stated that appeals to religious beliefs do not render a suspect’s statements 
involuntary, such appeals can increase the pressure on the suspect and thus fall within the 
scope of activity Miranda sought to eliminate. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263; Miranda, 
384 U.S. at 448–51; Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 288. 
96 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2262; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468–69. 
97 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256, 2262. The evidence conflicted as to whether 
Thompkins orally indicated that he understood his rights, but the Court found “more than 
enough evidence” to conclude he understood. See id. The Court noted that the police pro-
vided Miranda warnings in writing and asked Thompkins to read one of them to ensure he 
could read and understand English. Id. at 2256. The fact that he could read and under-
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level of understanding required by Miranda, however, exceeds such cur-
sory knowledge.98 Although suspects may understand the language in 
which the warnings are given, the uneducated populations Miranda 
sought to protect likely do not possess a full understanding of the nature 
of their rights and the legal implications of waiving them.99 Whether 
Thompkins actually understood his Miranda rights is perhaps debatable; 
what is not debatable is the negative impact the Court’s ruling will have 
on the poor and uneducated suspects Miranda intended to protect.100 
 Regardless of whether the Court was faithful to its precedent in 
Thompkins, the law after Thompkins is clear: whenever an accused sus-
pect is not overtly coerced, understands his or her rights, is given Mi-
randa warnings, and remains almost completely silent but later con-
fesses after continued (and subtly coercive) questioning, he or she has 
engaged in “a course of conduct indicating waiver” under Butler.101 This 
ruling will infringe on the Fifth Amendment rights of criminal suspects 
established in Miranda.102 The holding reduces the government’s bur-
den to show waiver; it also encourages police to continue their interro-
                                                                                                                      
stand English was, for the majority, sufficient to establish Thompkins’s understanding. See 
id. at 2262. 
98 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. Miranda requires that a defendant “knowingly and in-
telligently” waive his right. Id. To satisfy this standard, the suspect must be aware of “both 
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon 
it.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). 
99 See Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 247–48; Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1577. Police 
inform suspects that what they say can be used against them in court but police do not 
apprise suspects of the consequences of silence. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 823. As a re-
sult, suspects could reasonably fear that by remaining silent or asking for a lawyer they are 
incriminating themselves. See id. To alleviate this problem, Professor Strauss argues the 
prescribed warnings should include assurances that the invocation of rights will not in-
criminate the suspects. Id. Under current conditions, evidence that the suspect speaks the 
language in which the warnings are given simply is not enough to establish a suspect’s 
“understanding,” contrary to the Court’s position in Thompkins. See Thomas, supra note 87, 
at 1082. 
100 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256–57, 2264; id. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); 
Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1577. The fact that warnings are read is not sufficient to en-
sure that a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently because understanding the warnings 
takes a higher education level than many suspects possess. Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 
1577; see also Floralynn Einesman, Confessions and Culture: The Interaction of Miranda and 
Diversity, 90 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 37 (1999) (“The validity of a suspect’s waiver is, 
by far, the most controversial issue in the matter of Miranda rights and cultural or ethnic 
background.”). 
101 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263, 2264 (majority opinion); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455; 
Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 288. But see Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing) (“Miranda and Butler expressly preclude the possibility that the inculpatory statements 
themselves are sufficient to establish waiver.”). 
102 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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gations until suspects either confess or come up with the magic words 
to invoke the right to counsel clearly.103 There is no other way a suspect 
can effectively bring a custodial interview to an end.104 This may lead to 
an increase in false confessions.105 It will certainly increase law-
enforcement authorities’ ability to subvert the rights of criminal sus-
pects with impunity.106 
III. Unjust Consequences: The Practical Result of Thompkins 
 Thompkins will negatively impact all criminal suspects, but its dual 
holdings will have more damaging effects on the poor and minority 
populations who have been relatively powerless throughout U.S. his-
tory.107 First, by requiring that a suspect clearly invoke the right to re-
main silent, the Court institutes a doctrine that provides “systematically 
inferior protection to the least powerful in society.”108 Second, by lower-
ing the prosecution’s burden to show waiver, Thompkins will lead to a 
further retrenchment of the rights of minority suspects.109 
 Jurists and scholars alike recognize the differential impact of a 
clear invocation rule with respect to asserting a right effectively during 
a custodial interrogation.110 Such a rule favors those with more direct 
                                                                                                                      
103 See id.; Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1583–84. Professor Weisselberg demonstrates 
the manner in which police training manuals and actual academy courses instruct officers 
based on Supreme Court rulings. Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1583. He found that police 
understand that express waivers are preferred, but “implied waivers-—and resulting state-
ments—are preferred to no waiver at all.” Id. at 1585. Because the Court has now issued 
another decision that “tolerate[s] tactics that diminish Miranda’s effectiveness,” it is safe to 
conclude that officers will be trained to use those tactics. See id. at 1583, 1592. 
104 See Strauss, supra note 20, at 811–14. 
105 See Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations and Confes-
sions: A Handbook 195–96 (2003). Whether false confessions are a major problem is 
open for debate. Compare Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that the Court’s cases 
leading up to the Miranda decision indicated a concern with the reliability of coerced 
statements), with Thomas & Leo, supra note 3, at 220 (noting that false confessions were 
not a major concern in Miranda). That false confessions do occur is not similarly open for 
debate. See John Schwartz, Confessing to Crime, but Innocent, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2010, at 
A14. 
106 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Weisselberg, supra note 
5, at 1591–92. 
107 See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 261. 
108 See id. 
109 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262 (2010); Einesman, supra note 100, 
at 37, 49, 47; Thomas, supra note 87, at 1082. 
110 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469–70 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring); 
Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 306–08; Strauss, supra note 20, at 1056; Weisselberg, supra note 
5, at 1589. 
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and assertive speech patterns.111 As a corollary, the clear invocation rule 
negatively impacts indigent, uneducated populations more than other 
segments of society.112 This doctrine is much more harmful to margin-
alized and powerless groups because they are more likely to use indi-
rect language and be less assertive, particularly in the context of a po-
lice interrogation.113 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260; Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 320. At the time of Pro-
fessor Ainsworth’s article, Davis had not been decided yet, so there were three ways that 
courts treated invocation questions. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 452 (majority opinion); Ains-
worth, supra note 5, at 301–02. The method the article argued was least sensitive to the 
issue of differences in speech patterns, “the threshold-of-clarity standard,” was the stan-
dard adopted in Davis. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 461–62; Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 306–07, 
320 (“In limiting their consideration to the literal sense of the suspects’ words, courts ap-
plying the threshold-of-clarity standard penalize those whose indirect speech acts rely upon 
normal conversational implicature for their meaning.”). The second standard, called “the 
clarification standard,” is a sort of middle ground, requiring officers to ask questions and 
clarify the intent of suspects after ambiguous statements. See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 
308. The majority of the courts had applied this standard and, although this is the stan-
dard the officers in Davis followed, the majority held that it was unnecessary. See 512 U.S. 
at 461–62; Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 308. Professor Ainsworth, conversely, advocated for 
an approach called the per se standard, “the polar opposite of the threshold-of-clarity 
standard.” Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 307, 320. Under this standard, ambiguous requests 
for counsel are given full legal weight and result in ending the interrogation. Id. at 306–07. 
112 See Davis, 512 U.S. at 469–70 (Souter, J., concurring); Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 
261. Justice Souter first articulated this argument in his concurrence in Davis, in which he 
remarked, 
[C]riminal suspects who may (in Miranda’s words) be “thrust into an unfamil-
iar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation procedures,” 
would seem an odd group to single out for the Court’s demand of height-
ened linguistic care. A substantial percentage of them lack anything like a 
confident command of the English language, many are “woefully ignorant,” 
and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the interrogation process 
or overwhelmed by the uncertainty of their predicament that the ability to 
speak assertively will abandon them. 
512 U.S. at 469–70 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). Indeed, even the 
majority in Davis indicated its awareness of this problem but declared that “the primary 
protection afforded suspects subject to custodial interrogation is the Miranda warnings 
themselves.” See id. at 460 (majority opinion). Professor Ainsworth argues that the use of 
certain language is less effective both with respect to communicating a desire to assert 
one’s rights to the interrogator, and proving to the court that one was attempting to assert 
one’s right. See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 261, 291–92. 
113 See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 320. Although Professor Ainsworth’s study dubs the 
language relevant to the analysis “the female register,” and its use is correlated with the 
female mode of communication, studies also show the same analysis applies to other 
communities as well. See id. at 285, 317; see also William M. O’Barr, Linguistic Evidence: 
Language, Power, and Strategy in the Courtroom 70 (1982) (concluding that the 
register “is more appropriately termed powerless language”); Thurmon Garner, Cooperative 
Communication Strategies: Observations in a Black Community, 14 J. Black Stud. 233, 234–35 
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 The unjust results of the clear invocation rule are exacerbated be-
cause the “rights of suspects in police custody are at risk not only be-
cause of how they speak, but also because of how the police hear and 
interpret their words.”114 A listener interprets speech not by attempting 
to glean what the speaker means, but by asking what the listener would 
have meant by the statement.115 This social reality becomes especially 
problematic in the context of a custodial interrogation, where a signifi-
cant power differential characterizes the relationship between the in-
terrogator and the suspect.116 Interrogators are likely to treat unin-
tended degrees of equivocation as total ambiguity.117 Under Thompkins, 
such unintended degrees of equivocation allow an interrogator to con-
tinue the questioning even after the suspect attempted to invoke the 
right to remain silent.118 Thus, Thompkins’s application in the police 
interrogation room can and will lead to interrogators violating sus-
pects’ rights.119 
 The language register difference is just one problem that arises 
from the Thompkins holdings that disproportionately affects minori-
ties.120 In decreasing the government’s burden to show waiver, Thomp-
kins indirectly exacerbates a problem caused by courts’ failure to give 
weight to the cultural differences of suspects.121 Although courts pur-
port to take cultural factors into consideration, as long as the warnings 
are “given in a language that the suspect understands, courts find 
                                                                                                                      
(1983) (observing similar indirect speech patterns are common within the spoken lan-
guage of African American communities). 
114 See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 288. 
115 Id. at 289. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 290. 
118 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 288–90. 
119 See Ainsworth, supra note 5, at 288–90; Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1583–84, 1592. 
Again, this problem is exacerbated because after a suspect’s attempted invocation is ig-
nored, the resulting frustration or confusion often leads the suspect to cease any further 
attempt. See Strauss, supra note 20, at 775. A suspect may then feel that the only way to end 
the interrogation is to tell the interrogators what they want to hear. See Gudjonsson, supra 
note 105, at 195–96. Of course, the interrogator’s goal is only to obtain such confessions, 
without regard to the suspect’s motivation for confessing. See Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 
1583–84, 1592. 
120 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2264; Weisselberg, supra note 5, at 1590 (arguing that 
implied waiver holdings combine with invocation holdings to abridge the Fifth Amend-
ment privileges of suspects further); see also Einesman, supra note 100, at 47 (concluding 
that “the suspect’s cultural heritage and language abilities affect every facet of Miranda”). 
121 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2271–72 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Einesman, supra 
note 100, at 45, 47 (arguing it is “not particularly onerous for the Government to prove a 
valid waiver,” and that cultural differences must be considered in applying Miranda). 
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waiver in almost every case.”122 The problem with Thompkins’s expan-
sion of the implied waiver doctrine is that cultural differences affect the 
true voluntariness of waivers.123 For example, some cultures mandate 
compliance with authorities and furthermore, suspects in a cultural 
minority may lack experience with the U.S. legal system.124 It is “criti-
cally important” to consider the “roles culture and language play in the 
interpretation of confession law,” especially when considering how to 
establish waiver.125 Although courts claim to take these factors into con-
sideration, they do not seem to affect rulings on waiver.126 Thompkins, by 
decreasing the government’s burden, exacerbates the problem that 
culture is not sufficiently considered in determining waiver.127 
Conclusion 
 In Thompkins, the Supreme Court departed further from Miranda’s 
concerns with the rights of indigent or uneducated minorities and the 
coercive effect of police interrogations. The Miranda Court decided 
that the “values embodied within the Fifth Amendment outrank the 
prosecution’s desire to obtain an admission of guilt from a suspect in 
custody.”128 As time has passed, however, the Court has placed more 
emphasis on law enforcement needs and the state interest in bright-line 
rules. Miranda’s force as precedent has been limited and, unless the 
Court or Congress reverses the trend away from protecting suspects’ 
rights in custodial interrogations, Thompkins will continue to apply un-
equally and unjustly, harming the very segments of society Miranda 
sought to protect. 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Thomas, supra note 87, at 1082; see also Einesman, supra note 100, at 40–46 (sur-
veying different factors courts have purported to consider in determining waiver, such as 
language, culture, and familiarity with the court system). 
123 See Einesman, supra note 100, at 37, 39 (noting there are “major cultural factors in 
determining the validity of a Miranda waiver”). 
124 See id. at 39. (“If a person does not understand his rights due to language or cul-
tural difficulties, or if his culture mandates that he comply with government authorities, 
then a Miranda waiver may be suspect.”). 
125 See id. at 37, 47. 
126 See Thomas, supra note 87, at 1082. 
127 See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Einesman, supra note 
100, at 47. 
128 Weisselberg, supra note 2, at 122–23. 
